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Along with the rise of public–private partnerships (PPPs) as a mainstream procurement 
system, we have seen a growing interest in studies of risk allocation in these projects. One 
of the serious academic endeavours is to apply both transaction cost economics (TCE) and 
the resource-based view (RBV) to explain risk allocation patterns found in PPP projects. The 
existing literature along these lines is deficient in three aspects: inappropriate choice of unit 
of analysis; poor specification of governance structure; and misinterpretation of asset 
specificity. A way for improvement is to analyse risk allocation in the context of PPP 
procurement in its entirety. 
 





In recent decades, we have seen an increasing number of governments around the world 
join the bandwagon of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in an effort to improve efficiency in 
the provision of public services. Risk allocation plays a pivotal role in the pursuit of value for 
money in PPP procurement (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2006). That is why risk allocation in 
PPP projects has emerged as a vibrant research topic. In the existing literature on this 
topic, some researchers use transaction cost economics (TCE) as theoretical grounding for 
their explanation of risk allocation patterns found in PPP projects. As will be elaborated 
later, the methodologies employed in these papers are flawed. This line of inquiry has yielded 
a number of papers in leading construction management journals, such as Jin (2010) and Jin 
and Doloi (2008). As these papers share a common theoretical core, for ease of exposition, 
‘JD Model’ is used in the following discussion to indicate the arguments of these papers. If 
these deficiencies of argument are left unattended, it could impede the emergence of a 
better analytical model for a proper understanding of risk allocation in PPP projects. 
 
To set the stage for the JD Model in the third section of this paper, the rubric of transaction 
cost reasoning is elaborated in the second section. Those two sections are aimed at 
evaluating the JD Model against the TCE framework and discussing the implications for the 
development of a theoretical understanding of risk allocation in PPP projects in the future.  
 
Nature of governance structures in TCE 
According to Williamson’s own definition, governance structure is referred to as ‘the 
institutional matrix in which the integrity of a transaction is decided’ (Williamson, 1996, 
p. 378). In TCE empirical studies, the focus is normally placed on three common types of 
 governance structures: market, hierarchy, and hybrid. Why do governance structures 
matter in the comparison of efficacy of economic organizations? Unlike neoclassical 
economists who envisage trading can proceed in a frictionless world through complete 
contracting, transaction cost economists acknowledge  
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the costs and differential competencies of governance structures in regulating transaction 
relationships. In principle, governance structures are meant to solve three fundamental 
problems: first, how to increase the total gain from trade by eliciting traders’ best efforts; 
second, how to facilitate best response to economic changes during the contracting period; 
third, how to reduce the impact of disputes. Williamson (1991) posits that governance 
structures can solve these problems with varying efficacy (Williamson, 1991, p. 281): 
 
1. Incentives and controls: The advantage of the market is that, under full exposure to 
market risks, traders have strong incentives to perform to their best. However, under 
hierarchy, suppliers become employees and the output of the workers is pooled, 
which more or less insulates them from bearing the full cost of shirking. To keep 
underperformance in check, the employer then needs to ramp up monitoring and 
motivate the workers through career progression. The choice between market and 
hierarchy is tantamount to a choice between high-powered incentive (market) and 
low-powered incentive (hierarchy). 
2. Adaptability: In instantaneous market transactions, traders are under pressure to 
make timely and opportune responses to market changes in order to stay in the 
game. However, this so-called ‘spontaneous adaptability’ would be inhibited where 
transactions have duration and involve lump-sum investments in specific assets 
(Williamson, 1996, Chapters 4 and 6). Once specific investments are sunk, the invest-
ing party will forfeit some flexibility to switch the assets to an alternative use. The 
losses arising from redeployment of the assets would leave him/her in a position 
vulnerable to exploitation in renegotiations. When one party makes an opportunistic 
move, the other will not normally back down without resistance, making it inevitable for 
both of them to incur transaction costs in settling disputes. For transactions 
entailing specific investments, coordinated adaptability by way of authority offers a 
more efficient solution for holdup problems. 
3. Contract law: TCE is built on the assumption of contract incompleteness, namely it 
considers the cases where unforeseen events might drift the contractual relationship 
out of the governable range and cause frictions between traders. The cost for resolving 
disputes varies with the regime of contract law to which disputes can be referred. In 
market transactions, disputes need to be resolved through a costly process (e.g. 
litigation, arbitration). By contrast, firms can settle internal disputes (say, 
disagreement between two departments of a company) in a more efficient way 
because of forbearance law that allows them to exercise fiat to reach final settlement 
without recourse to the courts as the final resort. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of governance structures in these three dimensions mean 
none of them commands an absolute advantage over the other two in efficiency terms, 
rendering it economical to align governance structures with transaction attributes (asset 
specificity, frequency and uncertainty). This is the fundamental reason why TCE has 
strong predictive power for real-life choices of governance structures. As a result, the 
extent to which governance structures under study could  impinge upon the efficiency 




A synopsis of  the JD Model  
In Jin and Doloi (2008), risk allocation in PPP projects is conceptualized as an exchange of 
risk management responsibilities between the government and the project company. They 
argue that how much risk one party should take depends on the attributes of risk 
management responsibilities under negotiations at tender. These attributes are of four types: 
the trading counterparty’s capability in managing risks, prior trad ing history with the party 
(proxied as frequency), environment uncertainty and the party’s risk management commitment 
(tantamount to behavioural uncertainty of TCE). Different proportions of risk transfer from 
the government to the private sector are deemed as governance structures. Different 
degrees of risk transfer are treated as equivalent to ‘make’ (0%), ‘make and buy’ (between 
0% and 100%) and ‘buy’ (100%) decisions, respectively. It  is argued that the four types of 
attributes jointly determine the proportion of risks desirable for the government to transfer 
(which is a step corresponding to the alignment of governance structures with transaction 
attributes in TCE). 
 
Three cr i t iques of  the JD Model  
For TCE to work in the explanation of risk allocation decisions, the JD Model conceives of 
risk allocation as ‘a transaction of risk management responsibility between potential risk 
bearers’ (Jin and Doloi, 2008, p. 711) and posits that ‘different allocation strategies 
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are in fact different governance structures of risk management’ (Jin and Doloi, 2008, p. 
711). What this construct actually captures is ‘proportion of risk management task 
transferred from public to private partner for risk X’ (Jin and Doloi, 2008, p. 712). As this is 
the cornerstone of the model, a central question is whether risk allocation can qualify as a 
governance structure. With reference to the definition of governance structure in TCE and 
its role in transaction cost reasoning, the answer is in the negative. 
 
The first issue is concerned with the choice of unit of analysis. In the JD Model, exchange 
of ‘risk management responsibility’ is treated as a transaction. It is true that PPP 
procurement involves an exchange of risk management responsibility and that there is con-
sensus in government guidance (Office of Government  Commerce,  2002,  2009;  Her  
Majes ty ’s  Treasury, 2006), practical guides (Simon et al., 1997; Institute of Civil Engineers, 
1998; Project Management Institute, 2000; Walewski and Gibson, 2003) and textbooks 
(Yescombe, 2002; Smith et al., 2007; Winch 2010) that risks should be assigned to the par-
ties who can best manage/control them. Risk-managing capability can affect risk-bearing 
cost and thus should be a key determinant of risk allocation. Misallocation of project risks 
therefore would damage value for money for the whole procurement. But does it mean 
‘risk management responsibility’ is an appropriate unit of analysis? In TCE, ‘[a] transaction 
occurs when a good or service is transferred across a techno logically separable interface’ 
(Williamson, 1996, p. 379). By this definition, it is not wrong to think of trading of ‘risk 
management responsibility’ as a transaction. However, an essential qualifier for a transac-
tion being a unit of analysis is that it can be mediated by governance structures (markets, 
hybrids, hierarchies). As will be discussed in the second point, the so-called governance 
structures in the JD Model are actually the outcomes of negotiations for ‘risk management 
responsibility’ at tender, serving none of the theoretical functions of governance structures. 
Without genuine governance structures, this calls into question whether the unit of 
analysis has been well chosen. 
 
Second, the focus of the JD Model is concerned with the agreed-upon assignment of 
 responsibility between traders for handling risk events. In the world of incomplete 
contracting, ex ante agreement may not be maintained ex post. The issue of concern 
should be the mechanism through which the loss/gain will be allocated between parties after 
risks eventuate. An essential condition for ‘risk management responsibil ity’ to be tradable 
is that one party’s promise of retaining responsibility can be enforced by a third party.  
Enforceability depends considerably on how well the risk management responsibility 
can be draf ted into contractual c lauses and l inked to payment. Without a contract 
as the enforcement mechanism, evading the consequence of a risk event that one party 
agrees to take on ex ante will go unpenalized, making the ex ante promise no more 
than a goodwill gesture. Who eventually bears the impact of the risk depends not only on 
the pre-agreed allocation, but also on contractual arrangement, payment mechanism and 
financial risk management instruments used. The efficacy of a combination of these 
factors in securing the attainment of a pre- agreed risk allocation should be endogenized 
in the decision of risk allocation. 
 
The third problem of the JD Model is associated with the application of the concept of 
asset specificity. It claims ‘the most important specified’i assets in any RM [risk 
management] service transaction would be the organizational RM capability’ (Jin and Doloi, 
2008, p. 710). Jin and Doloi attribute asset specificity to two sources: risk management 
routine and risk management mechanism. In what sense can we regard risk 
management routine as a specific asset? The authors submitted ‘the longer the history 
of a RM routine (a transaction-specific asset), the more productive activities have been 
carried out, which means more alternative use has been made of the asset, and 
accordingly, the less specific the RM rou t ines become’ (Jin and Doloi, 2008, p. 710).  
The r isk management mechanism in the JD Model encompasses the four standard 
components of a risk management framework: risk identification, risk analysis, risk response 
and risk monitoring/control. The completeness and experience in the implementation of 
this system is labelled as ‘specific assets maturity’ (Jin and Doloi, 2008, p. 710). Odd 
terminology aside, a fundamental problem rests with failure to acknowledge the 
distinction between investment specific to an individual transaction and specific assets in 
general terms. The reason why assets specificity offers the greatest explanatory power for 
TCE reasoning is that its presence is correlated with the magnitude of transaction 
costs. The reasoning runs as follows. Some transactions require lumpy investments, 
which, once sunk, would lose most of their value, were they redeployed to an alternative 
use. The investing party has much more to lose than the other, were the transaction to 
stall, and thus would be subject to holdup demands when renegotiations arise. One 
party’s intention to take advantage of another’s vulnerability would prompt fierce disputes 
and, as a consequence, cause the ex post costs of maladaptation. In the presence of 
asset specificity, accommodat ing  changes through the market  becomes costly. In 
this regard, hierarchy has the  
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advantage in that adaptation can be implemented relatively easily by way of 
administrative orders. The increase in specificity of investments in a transaction would tip the 
scale of comparative desirability from the market to the hierarchy at certain point. The 
causal link between asset specificity and choice of governance structures is a key to 
making TCE arguments refutable. When applying the same logic to examine two types 
of  specif ic assets in the JD Model, we can easily identify the reasons why they do not 
qualify well as cases of transaction-specific investment: 
 
1. Generally speaking, these intangible assets are not invested specifically for a 
 particular PPP project. For example, risk management routine is measured by the 
public/private partner’s experience in managing risk X on a scale of 1 to 5, and risk 
management mechanism by the maturity of the public/private partner’s identification, 
analysis, response planning, and monitoring and control mechanisms for risk X. 
Without the ‘loss-of-value outside this transact ion’ element of the investment, the 
l ink between asset specificity and holdup problems (and thus transaction costs) is 
feeble. 
2. Even if, in rare cases, parties need to make investments in building risk management 
capability for a project, how significant would that investment be relative to the capital 
value of the project? Since in practice transferring risk to a third party (e.g. 
insurance company or financial risk management instrument vendors) is common, 
the investment really required seems rather trivial. 
 
Discussion 
As has been argued, the weaknesses of  the JD Model indicate its application of 
TCE is flawed. Drawing on the RBV alone would make the model look theoretically 
sounder, but the downside is that it could then only manage to scratch the surface  of the 
issue. 
 
It seems useful to take a broader view on risk allocation in PPP procurement. 
Governments put value for money as top priority in negotiations with PPP investors, with 
the aim of striking an optimal balance between risk transfer and its cost through a proper 
design of payment mechanism. Incentives in PPP contracts are mainly created through 
the link between performance indicators set against output specification and variable 
payments tied to them. 
 
While risk allocation is an important input in the value for money assessment, optimal 
risk allocation alone cannot guarantee value for money. Risk allocation patterns 
should be understood in the context of PPP procurement in its entirety. In a world of 
incomplete contracting, governance structures regulating the assignment of the impacts 
of risk events should warrant higher weighting than agreed-upon risk allocation in the 
explanation of risk allocation arrangement. 
 
Concl us i ons  and recomm endat i ons  
The JD Model reviewed in this note is a credible attempt to enhance our understanding 
of risk allocation in PPP contracts. However, the model suffers from three deficiencies, 
namely: inappropriate choice of unit of analysis, poor specification of governance structure, 
and misinterpretation of asset specificity. Addressing these critiques is an essential step 
towards a better application of TCE to the study of PPP contracts in general, and 
risk allocation in PPP contracts in particular. 
 
This research suggests improvements can be made in the future, in three ways: 
 
1. Unit of analysis: Risk allocation is an integral part of PPP transactions. The optimality 
of risk allocation cannot be judged in its own right, but needs to be viewed in the 
context of value for money of the whole PPP project. 
2. Operationalization of transaction attributes: PPP projects may entail specific 
investments, but, to correctly identify the source of asset specificity, researchers 
should consider taking a more rigorous approach. An example is demonstrated in 
Chang and Ive (2007) where a special form of asset specificity, process specificity, 
was discovered through examination of the evolution of the client’s and the contrac-
tor’s quasi rent during the construction period. 
 3. Nature of governance structures: A PPP transaction consists of a web of contractual 
relationships. A fundamental problem of the JD Model is that it treats PPP transactions 
as if they were insurance transactions. This methodological position is ill-conceived 
because it ignores the fact that PPP projects involve huge efforts and resources from 
the contractor to deliver output. In future studies, researchers should re-examine the 
nature of PPP governance. Transaction cost, payoff rights and property rights ii are all 
expected to offer important theoretical angles for understanding PPP governance. 
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i
 The word ‘specified’ in this context seems to carry the same meaning as ‘specific’ in the 
TCE literature, but this usage should be avoided. 
 
ii
 See Gibbons (2005) for an excellent comparison of these three perspectives. 
 
